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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact of corporate governance on European bank performance 
during the period 2002-2011. Using a sample of 73 banks from 11 European countries, we 
examine the relationship between corporate governance measures more specifically the board 
size and composition, the gender diversity and the CEO duality on the European bank 
performance. During the period 2002-2011, our results show that the board size and the gender 
diversity have a positive and significant impact on bank performance. Large board of directors 
with more female members led to better bank performance, whereas, the board composition and 
the CEO duality have no significant effect in explaining the bank performance for the European 
countries. During the global financial crisis, our findings show that the board size and the board 
composition are negatively and significantly correlated to the bank performance. Smaller boards 
of directors with less number of independent (non-executive) directors have outperformed the 
ones with larger boards and more independent directors during the crisis. However, the gender 
diversity and the CEO duality have no significant impact on the European bank performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2008 the world economy confronted the most 
terrible and dangerous financial crisis, since the 
Great Depression of 1930s. The contagion started in 
United States in 2007 and spread quickly first to the 
whole US financial sector and then to different 
financial markets overseas. A spectacular fall in 
prices of the shares appeared in all important world 
markets followed by a massive number of collapses. 
Many European and American banks declared huge 
losses in 2007-2008. Moreover, largest bankruptcies 
have taken place during the financial crisis 2008, 
such as the bankruptcy of the Lehaman Brothers, the 
oldest investment bank, Merill Lynch, Morgan 
Stanley and then Goldman Sacks, due to the huge 
economic catastrophe, the US government have 
intervened in order to stop further collapse and 
bankruptcy. However, the contagion spread 
everywhere and hit also the European banks. The 
Global Financial crisis showed how little we know 
about the corporate governance in banks and how it 
is important for the banking sector. Corporate 
governance in banks has special features compared 
to non-financial companies. The credit institutions 
are larger than the industrial firms regarding the 
balance sheet aggregates, also they are characterized 
by their complex organizational structure. (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003). The complexity of the banks 
increases the information asymmetry and decreases 
the stakeholder’s capability to supervise the 
decisions of the bank mangers. Banks play a crucial 
role for the overall health of an economy. They are 
also characterized by a high level of leverage due 
mostly to the deposits collected from their 
customers. For all these reasons, banks need special 
corporate governance features than the other 
companies, since they have the responsibility to 
protect the right of the depositors, guarantee the 
solidity of the payment system and decreasing the 
systematic risk. 
There are different types of corporate 
governance measures. On one hand, the internal 
corporate governance proxies which consist on the 
characteristic of the board of directors such board 
composition, gender diversity, board size, the CEO 
duality. On the other hand the external corporate 
governance proxies which consist on the audit 
committee, the government regulations, the leverage 
and the debt. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BSBS) has paid more attention to the 
need to understand and improve the corporate 
governance of financial corporations and especially 
for banks, by stating that good corporate governance 
is essential to guarantee a better bank performance. 
Enhancing corporate governance structure including 
the size and the composition of the board has been 
the major issue undertaken by the international 
authorities (Basel Committee, 2006). In addition, 
corporate governance is regulated by local 
establishments and the framework of such 
guidelines is changing over the time for instance, 
Norway, Germany and UK are among the European 
countries who updated their corporate governance 
code in 2012.  
Many studies have focused on the impact of 
corporate governance on non-financial companies 
and few of them have concentrated on banks’ 
corporate governance (eg, Andreas and Vallelado, 
2008; Adams and Mahran, 2008; Caprio et al, 2007). 
Moreover, a limited number of researchers have 
investigated the corporate governance on European 
countries (eg. Staikouras, 2007; Conyon and Peck, 
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2010). Therefore, the issue associated to the effect 
of corporate governance and bank performance 
especially in European countries has received 
unequal attention compared to non-financial firms 
and American banks.  
This paper aims to narrow down the gap and 
offer a better understanding of the corporate 
governance in European banks. We investigate 
whether there is a relationship between corporate 
governance and European banks performance, 
focusing on different proxies of governance such as 
the board size, the board composition, the gender 
diversity and the CEO duality and their impact on 
bank performance over the period 2002-2011.  In 
addition, the global financial crisis of 2008 in the 
banking sector and its effect on the collapse of stock 
prices and recession of the economy worldwide may 
yet oblige the companies to enhance their corporate 
governance mechanisms and regulations. Moreover, 
this study is the first, to our knowledge associated 
the bank performance with the corporate 
governance measures during the global financial 
crisis 2008 for the European countries. 
The paper is organized as follows: session 2 
presents the literature review which includes the 
specific characteristics of corporate governance in 
banks, the corporate governance regulations on 
European countries as well as the theoretical and 
empirical evidences related to the relationships 
between the corporate governance and bank 
performance in general and during the crisis, In 
session 3 we describe our sample, variables and the 
model used to test the impact of corporate 
governance in European banks performance and 
finally, the last session presents the findings and 
discussion. 
 
2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKS 
 
2.1. What is special about corporate governance in 
banks? 
 
Most of the existing literature on corporate 
governance has focused on firm performance and 
very limited research have been paid attention to the 
corporate governance of banks (Levine 2004, Caprio 
et al 2007). However, the corporate governance on 
banks is very complex and unique compared to non- 
financial firms for different reasons. First, banks are 
large organizations and corporate governance is 
necessary for banks to perform effectively. Second, 
according to Levine (1997) the banks play an 
important role on economic development and 
growth. Moreover, these organizations have a central 
role on mobilizing savings and convert them into 
productive investment. They are a source of 
external financing for the others firms especially in 
emerging and developing economies. Banks also play 
a key role in corporate governance of different firms 
as equity holders and creditors of firms in different 
countries. Thus, it is necessary that banks have a 
good corporate governance so they can apply 
efficient governance to the companies they fund. 
Since the banking sector is vulnerable to shock, 
deficiency in corporate governance can damage the 
financial system and pose systematic risk to the 
economy (OECD, 2006). Governments are afraid 
about the reputation of the banks. So, they pay a 
special attention to regulate the governance of these 
large corporations. As a failure in bank’s governance 
would affect their performance and affects 
respectively the country’s economy and could even 
spread globally, this is what happened during the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997 (Pathan et al., 2008) 
and U.S financial crisis in 2008 (Peni and Vahamaa, 
2012). In addition, Kirkpatrick (2009) claimed that 
the reasons of the financial crisis could be explained 
by the weaknesses and the failure of corporate 
governance. For instance, they explain that there are 
some insufficient areas in regulatory requirement 
and accounting standards. Corporate governance of 
banks is also unique. Banks have two special 
characteristics that make them different from the 
others firms: Regulation and opaqueness. First, 
banks are more opaque than non-financial firms, 
Morgan (2002) claims that the problem of 
information asymmetries between insiders and 
outsiders still higher in banks. In addition, the 
higher opacity in banks increases the agency 
problem. For instance, the depositors and 
shareholders would be unable to monitor the banks 
managers and it could be easier for insiders to 
exploit outside investors. Second, banks are 
extremely regulated. The importance of banks in the 
development and the growth of economy make it 
essential for the government from all over the world 
to put strict regulations requirement for the banks 
which can be considered as supplementary 
corporate governance mechanisms (Levine 2004). 
The traditional corporate governance 
mechanisms could be limited by the impact of the 
regulations policies imposed by different countries. 
For instance, many governments have restrained the 
concentration of bank ownership. Furthermore, 
there are certain restrictions of the ability of 
outsiders to purchase a large proportion of banks’ 
shares without the approval of the government. Also 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
has set up a regulation regarding the number of 
independent directors in the board of directors. 
Moreover, the Sarbanes - Oxley act of 2002 requires 
that the boards of audit committees should have 
only independent outside directors. Overall, 
regarding the importance of the banks in country’s 
economy, banks should pay attention to their 
governance. As good corporate governance has a 
positive impact on bank performance. However, 
there are several measures of corporate governance 
such as the characteristics of boards of directors, 
the ownership structure, which have an impact on 
banks performance.  
 
2.2. Corporate governance regulations in European 
banks 
 
After the global financial crisis that hit the word 
economy in 2008, many Europeans banks have set 
up many rules and regulations related to the 
corporate governance in order to improve their 
banks performance. Corporate governance rules and 
norms are essential components for successful 
market economies. European countries have shown 
their interest in improving corporate governance 
guidelines since it could have a significant impact on 
bank performance. There is a major difference 
between corporate governance on European 
countries related to the board structure, some of the 
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European countries use the unitary system the 
others use the two-tier system. 
The one-tier board structure is predominant in 
European countries and it is characterized by one 
single board including both executive and non-
executive directors. All the directors have the same 
objectives and goals and they are responsible for all 
the activities of the company. The one-tier board 
structure is predominant in UK, Spain, Ireland, 
Portugal and Italy (Maassen, 2002). On the other 
hand, the two-tier board structure require a strict 
separation between the management function 
(executives) and the supervisory function (non-
executives). The management board has the 
responsibility to run the business while the 
supervisory board has the obligation to oversee the 
direction of the business. This type of board 
structure is mandatory in Germany, Netherland, 
Austria and Denmark (Macy and O’Hara, 2003). 
Despite the formal structural differences between 
the two types of boards structure the one–tier and 
the two-tier system, there are a significant 
similarities in both structures. The two types of 
systems are elected by shareholders. Moreover, there 
is usually a managerial function and a supervisory 
function for both structures, while this distinction is 
more formalized in two-tier board structure.Both 
board systems have comparable functions, the 
supervisory board and the unitary board usually 
designate the directors of the managerial function. 
In addition, both systems have the responsibilities to 
ensure that the control systems and the financial 
reporting are working properly and the company is 
in agreement with law (Weil et al, 2002).  Other rules 
and regulations are established related to the 
leadership structure in European countries in order 
to improve the corporate governance of the banks. 
The leadership structure is whether the CEO and the 
chairman of the board should be the same or 
different person, for the two- tier systems each of 
the management and supervisory boards have their 
own separate leadership, the CEO and the chairman 
of the board is two different person (Hagendorff et 
al, 2013). However, in the unitary board system, it is 
common but not usual that the chairman of the 
board of directors is also the executive director of 
the company. Therefore, some codes suggest to 
separate the leadership role in order to increase the 
independency of the unitary board, to differentiate 
between the different roles and to reduce the 
conflict of interest. (Hagendorff et al, 2013) , for 
instance, in France, for decade, the law related to the 
unitary boards has required that the leadership 
should be combined, after a period the law has been 
changed to allow corporations to choose between 
separating or combining the CEO and the chairman 
in the unitary board (Vienot, 2002) , In contrast, the 
most common practice in both Spain and Italy is to 
combine the  role of the leadership structure in 
order to balance the power of the CEO and the 
chairman (Weil et al, 2002). 
Gender diversity on corporate boards still an 
important challenge for the European Union (EU) 
members. The women still face several barriers to be 
presented on the board of directors of banks. 
However, the board diversity is considered to be 
essential for the performance and effectiveness of 
the corporations (European commission, 2012). 
Several EU member have already established rules on 
gender quotas for firm boards for example, France 
and Spain require 40 percent of female by 2017 and 
2015 respectively,  Italy 30 percent female quota by 
2015.  Others countries insisted for equal 
representation between the two genders, for 
instance, Netherlands, require 30 percent for each 
gender by 2016 (Davies, 2014).   
However, only Norway, which is non EU 
member has implanted a law with strong sanctions 
for  boards of directors with less than two women by 
2006 and less than 40 percent women by 2008 
(Rasmussen and Hughes, 2011). 
To conclude, many European countries have 
established rules and regulations related to the 
corporate governance in order to improve the banks 
performance, therefore, there are different corporate 
governance measures which have an effect on bank 
performance. The following section presents the 
empirical evidence related to these relationships. 
 
2.3. Corporate governance and bank performance 
 
Different proxies of corporate governance have 
impact on bank performance. The board features 
(the board size, the board independence and the 
gender diversity) and CEO characteristic (CEO 
duality) are an important measures of corporate 
governance. In this section, the empirical and 
theoretical literature related to the relationship 
between the corporate governance proxies and bank 
performance in general and during the financial 
crisis 2008 is presented. 
 
2.3.1. Board size 
 
The board size of directors is an important measure 
of the corporate governance. However, different 
empirical studies find different results regarding the 
relationship between the corporations’ performance 
and the board size of directors. Scholars argue that 
a large board of directors could be more effective 
for the firm performance because they raise the pool 
of resources and expertise in the company which 
help them to make the best decision, and make it 
harder for the domination of a CEO. However, other 
studies demonstrate a negative correlation between 
the board size and firm performance. As the boards 
of directors’ increase, they become less efficient and 
might be more associated with bureaucratic 
problems and increase of decision-making time 
(Jensen, 1993). Moreover, others scholars explain 
when the boards of directors get too large, it 
becomes difficult to communicate, to coordinate and 
to participate, this would lead to a decrease in the 
company performance (Golden and Zajac, 2001). 
Some empirical studies related to the banking 
sector find different findings, Adams and Mehran 
(2005, 2008) show there is no negative relationship 
between board size and firm performance, they use 
a sample of 35 US large bank holding companies 
(BHCs) between the period of 1959 and 1999.  They 
found in contrast with non-financial companies, that 
the banking firms with large board of directors have 
a positive relationship with Tobin’s Q.  
The size of the board of directors is 
significantly related to the features of bank holding 
companies (BHC) structure and they explain that the 
difference between the results depends on the types 
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of companies; whether it is holding companies, 
financial or non-financial companies. 
Consistent with the finding of Adams and 
Mehran (2005, 2008), Andres and Vallelado (2008) 
examine a sample of large commercial banks from 
different developed countries France, Uk, Spain US 
and Canada and Italy. They find a positive relation 
between the board size and bank performance. The 
scholars explain that the presence of several 
directors in the board has a positive effect on the 
advisory functions, the monitoring, the 
improvement of governance and the increase of 
returns.  However,  the  authors  show  that  there  
is  a  limit  of  approximatively  of  19 directors. 
Other empirical studies find a negative relation 
between the board size and bank performance. 
Using a sample of 58 large European Banks during 
the period 2002-2004, Staikouras et al. (2007) find a 
negative relationship between bank profitability and 
the size of the Board of directors. Furthermore, 
Trabelsi (2010) reveal that the improvement of the 
number of board of directors has a negative impact 
on the performance of the banks which is measured 
by Tobin Q. 
Other studies demonstrate there is no 
significant relationship between board size of 
directors and bank performance. Ramano et al. 
(2012), Using a sample of 25 Italian banking groups 
during the period 2006 – 2010  they find that the 
board size does not impact the performance of the 
Italian bank in terms of ROA and ROE. They explain 
there is not an ideal board size for the banks and an 
increasing or decreasing in the board director’s size 
could have a negative or positive impact on the 
bank’s performance. Regarding the different 
contrasting theoretical and empirical evidence 
mentioned above we expect: 
H1: Board Size is positively related with bank 
performance. 
Different empirical studies have examined the 
impact of the board size on bank performance 
during the financial crisis , for example, Erkens et al 
(2012), using a sample of 296 financial firm from 30 
countries, they show  that during the crisis (2007-
2008) there is no significant relationship between 
the board size and firm performance. Moreover, 
Berger et al (2014) based on a sample of 256 no 
default and 85 default US commercial banks they 
found that the management structure including the 
board size were not decisive for the bank 
performance during the financial crisis (2007-2010). 
Other empirical evidences show different 
results, Aebei et al (2012) employing a sample of 372 
US bank during the financial crisis 2007-2008, they 
find a positive relationship between the board size 
and the bank performance measured by ROE and 
bank’s stock returns. However,  Hoque and 
Muradoglu (2010) based on a sample of 347 global 
banks from 57 countries around the world find that 
the board size and bank performance (ROA, ROE) are 
negatively related, they explain that smaller board of 
directors performs better than the larger one during 
the financial crisis. In addition, Peni and Vahama 
(2012) examine a sample of large publicly traded US 
banks they find that smaller boards have greater 
profitability and higher market valuation and less 
negative stock returns during the crisis. They 
explain that small board of directors is more 
efficient in tough periods as they take quick decision 
compared to the larger boards. Consistent with the 
previous empirical studies we expect that: 
H2: Board size and bank performance are 
negatively related during the financial crisis. 
 
2.3.2. Board composition 
 
Board composition is a significant corporate 
governance practice as it could affect the 
deliberations of the board and the capacity to 
control the different results and decisions. The 
findings of previous studies regarding the impact of 
the board composition to the bank performance are 
no conclusive. 
Andres and Vallelado (2008) explain that 
appointing outside directors is beneficial for the 
bank performance since it would avoid the conflict 
of interest between stakeholders and achieve the 
different functions of advising and monitoring in 
effective manner, these directors should have the 
majority on the board. However, the authors 
highlight that such majority has a limit and they 
explain that an extreme proportion of non-executive 
directors could harm the advisory role of boards, as 
the executive directors play an important role in 
facilitating the transfer of the information among 
the management and directors and provide 
information and skills that outside directors would 
find not easy to gather. Moreover, Romano and 
Guerrini  (2012) find that when the percentage of 
the independent directors on the board is higher, the  
financial reporting fraud is lower. This explaining by 
the great percentage of  independent directors who 
appears to guarantee more efficient control. The 
findings regarding the impact of outside directors 
are mixed in the banking sector. Some empirical 
studies show there is no relationship between the 
board composition and bank performance, for 
instance, Love and Rachinsky (2007) using a sample 
of 50 banks in Ukraine and 107 banks in Russia 
during the period 2003-2006 find there is no 
relationship between the two variables. However, 
other studies find that a great presence of 
independent member (non- executives) in their 
broads achieve a better performance than others. 
Busta (2007) after using a sample of 69 listed banks 
from different countries such France, UK, Spain, Italy 
and Germany, the author show that the banks who 
present a higher proportion of non- executives 
perform better in Continental countries while they 
find opposite result regarding the  case  of  United  
Kingdom. Moreover, Staikouras et al (2007) show 
there is a positive and significant relation between 
the boord independence and the bank performance 
measured by ROA, ROE and Tobin Q, using a sample 
of 58 European banks. They explain that the 
independent directors have a more objective opinion 
which is more efficient for the supervisory function. 
Based on the existing literature we expect:  
H3: The proportion of non-executive directors is 
positively related with bank performance. 
During the crisis, different empirical evidence 
have shown the impact of non-executive directors on 
bank performance, for instance, Cornett et al (2010) 
find a positive relationship between different 
corporate governance measures and bank 
performance during the crisis period, they explain 
that the more independent directors on the board, 
the better the bank performance during the crisis 
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based on a sample of 300 Us banks. However , other 
scholars find different results, Beltrati et al 
(2012)employing a sample of 98  large banks over 
the period 2007 until the end of 2008, the authors 
report that banks with more independent boards 
experienced lower stock  returns during the financial 
crisis. This is in line with the finding of Erkens et al 
(2012). Moreover, Minton et al (2010) Using a sample 
of 652 US banks over the period before and during 
the financial crisis 2008. They find that during the 
crisis there is a negative and significant relation 
between the board independence and the bank 
performance measured by Tobin Q and stock 
returns. They explain that boards with fewer 
interconnections are more efficient during the crisis, 
so that directors can concentrate more on a specific 
board.Based on the existing literature our hypothesis 
is as following:  
H4: Board independence is negatively related 
with bank performance during the financial crisis. 
 
2.3.3. Gender diversity 
 
Gender diversity is considered as an important 
component of corporate governance, according to 
Anastasopoulos et al (2002) the presence of women 
in the boards of directors is good instrument to 
enhance the board diversity. 
There are a small number of literature which 
are concentrated on the impact of the gender 
diversity on bank performance for instance, Zahra 
and Stanton (1988) find there is no significant 
relationship between the firm performance and 
gender diversity based on US context. However, 
according to Heinfeldt (2005) there is a positive 
correlation between the proportion of the female 
present on the board of directors and the market 
value added (MVA).  
In contrast with these findings, Shleifer et al 
(1997) using a sample of 200 US large firms find 
that the higher percentage of women on the board 
of directors is disproportionately associated with 
higher firm performance. They explain that the 
number of women in the top management is 
relatively low and present only 4.5% and there are 
no female chief executive. 
Focusing on the banking sector, de Cabo et al 
(2009), using a sample of 612 European banks 
during the period 1998 to 2004, their findings 
indicate that there is no significant relationship 
between the presence of the female on the board of 
directors and bank performance measured by ROA 
and ROE. 
Ramano et al. (2012) find that the presence of 
women on boards of directors has a positive impact 
on the bank performance measured by ROE and 
ROA; they explain that their presence on the board 
of directors of the bank holding enhance the 
economic findings and can contribute to a large pool 
of skills knowledge, competencies and relationships 
useful to rise the performances of the banks. 
However, the authors show that the presence of the 
women in the board of the banks holding companies 
is still limited. 
Selvam et al(2006) analysing a sample  of 13 
Indian banks over the period 2012-2013 they find 
that women directorship has a positive impact on 
the performance of banks where the government 
has a significant stake. Considering the existing 
literature our hypothesis:  
H5: Banks performance is positively related with 
the proportion of female in the board of directors. 
The issue of gender diversity has become more 
serious and persistent during the financial crisis, 
many researchers and economists have examined 
whether the higher participation of the women on 
the board of directors is related to better 
performance or not.  
Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn (2011) report that a 
higher proportion of female present on the board of 
directors is related with an increase in risk-taking 
during the US sub-prime crisis. Goel and Thakor 
(2008) consider that women are less confident than 
male, however, they explain that overconfidence is 
related to less information acquisition and provide 
poorer investment decision.  
Finally, due to the lack of the empirical 
evidence related to the impact of the gender 
diversity to the bank performance during the crisis, 
we expect that more female on the board of 
directors improve bank performance during the 
global financial crisis as it is important to appoint 
the most skilled and talented people independently 
of their gender in order to enhance the corporate 
governance as well as to accelerate and facilitate the 
changes that will be requested for a better economic 
prosperity growth (De Cabo et al, 2009). Even though 
that women are more risk averse and less 
overconfident regarding the financial decision 
making (Agnew et al, 2003). They have other 
important skills related to the leadership, creativity 
and innovation which are important to better 
corporate governance during the financial crisis. 
H6: Gender diversity is positively related with 
bank performance during the financial crisis. 
 
2.3.4. CEO duality 
 
CEO duality is another important measure of 
corporate governance and it refers to the situation 
when the CEO of the company also holds the 
position of the chairman of the board. 
There are a limited number of empirical studies 
who examined the impact of the CEO duality on the 
bank performance, Most of the previous studies 
have focused on non- banking sectors.  
The results of the previous studies are mixed 
and still no conclusive , Some of the empirical 
studies find no significant relationship between the 
CEO duality and bank/firm performance the others 
demonstrate a positive or negative relationship.  
The supporters of the CEO duality advocate 
that the CEO duality places the CEO in a powerful 
position in directing the company operations and 
allows him to make faster decisions (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996). Moreover, the CEO duality could be 
efficient when such duality can enhance 
performance and improve conformity. In addition, a 
CEO who also held the title of the chairman board is 
able to coordinate and manage board actions and set 
strategies more quickly especially in tough 
conditions such crisis. CEO duality could create 
stability for a company (by decreasing the likelihood 
of conflict of interest between the board of directors 
and the management) and thus improve 
performance. 
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However, the opponent of the CEO duality, 
such as the agency theory has underlined the need 
of separating the two positions in order to guarantee 
the board independence as well to enhance the firm 
transparency (Jensen, 1993), moreover, the 
concentration of the power can worsen the conflict 
of interest and reduces the supervision of the board 
manager and also decreases the information flow 
between the other board of directors (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983 Jensen, 1993). 
The empirical evidence regarding the banking 
sectors are insufficient, using a sample of 174 banks 
during the period 1995-2002, Belkhir (2009) found a 
positive and significant relationship between the 
CEO duality and bank performance measured by the 
Tobin Q and ROA. Whereas, Pi and Timme (1993) 
using a sample of 112 US banks during the period 
1987-1990 demonstrate that American banks where 
the CEO and the chairman of the board are not the 
same person outperformed  the banks with dual 
CEO. Moreover, Mishra and Nielsen (2000), using a 
sample of large bank holding companies 
demonstrate a negative and significant relationship 
between the CEO duality and accounting 
performance (ROE,ROA). 
Other empirical studies found there is no 
significant relationship between CEO duality and 
bank performance for example, Boussaada and 
Karmani (2015),  based on the sample of 38 banks in 
Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) over the 
period 2004-2011, the result indicates there is no 
significant relationship between the CEO duality and 
bank performance measured with ROA and ROE. 
They conclude that CEO duality has not impact on 
the MENA bank performance.  Based on the previous 
empirical studies we expect that: 
H7: CEO duality is negatively related with bank 
performance. 
A limited number of empirical studies have 
focused on the CEO duality and bank performance 
during the global financial crisis. Aebi et al (2012) 
show that there is no significant relation between 
the CEO duality and bank performance measured 
with buy and hold returns and ROE, using a sample 
of US bank during the period 2007-2008, Moreover, 
Berger et al (2012) using a sample of 294 Us bank 
failures and 4021 non default US commercial banks 
during the financial crisis 2007-2010, they 
demonstrate that the CEO duality do not have 
significant impact on bank performance. 
Carty and Weiss (2012) using a sample of US 
banks, they show there is no relation between CEO 
duality and bank failure during the financial crisis.  
Grove et al (2011) based on the sample of US 
commercial banks find a negative relation between 
the CEO duality and bank performance measured by 
ROA during the period of  pre-crisis (2006-2007) and 
negative but no significant association during the 
crisis (2008). 
Whether the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board or a different person there is not a significant 
impact for a better bank performance. Consistent 
with previous empirical studies we expect that:  
H8: CEO duality is not related with bank 
performance during the financial crisis. 
To sum up, based on the previous empirical 
studies, different corporate governance measures 
such as the board size , the board composition the 
gender diversity and CEO duality have an effect on 
bank performance,  this relationship depend on the 
period of the study whether it is  in general or 
during the crisis 
 
3. SAMPLE, VARIABLES AND MODEL 
SPECIFICATION 
 
3.1. Sample 
 
In this study we examine the impact of corporate 
governance (the board size, the board composition, 
the gender diversity and the CEO duality) on 
European bank performance. A lot of attention has 
been given on the corporate governance in US 
banking sector (eg, Peni and Vähämaa, 2011; Adam 
and Mehran, 2003; Yermack, 1996) However, a 
limited number of studies has focused on corporate 
governance in European countries (eg, Staikouras et 
al, 2007, Conyon and Peck, 2010).  For this reason, 
we decided to choose a sample of European banks 
and examine if there are similar results to the 
previous studies. The time period from 2002-2011 
has been chosen by the idea to investigate the 
impact of corporate governance on bank 
performance during a long period of 10 years and to 
compare first our results to the existing empirical 
studies without differentiate between the crisis and 
non-crisis periods after that we divide our sample 
into two period and examine the relationship before 
the crisis (2002-2006) and during the crisis 2008. In 
our research we use a secondary data. Our initial 
sample consist of the 110 largest European banks 
defined as banks that have at least a total assets of 
€10 billion between the period 2002-2011. 
The focus on the largest credit institutions 
helps to minimize the high cost of the manual data 
collection for the governance variables and to 
exclude the smallest banks. In addition, the 
requirement of large banks is imposed to examine 
the role of corporate governance in banks where the 
potential effect of poor governance could be more 
serious (Adams and Mehran, 2003; Booth et al, 
2002). The 100 largest banks are collected from 11 
European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Netherland, Poland, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and United Kingdom). We restrict our 
sample to banks that are covered by BoardEx which 
is the data source for our corporate governance 
variables. The BoardEx is the leading database 
specialized in information on boards’ composition 
and directors. This restriction decreases our sample 
to 82 banks. In addition, data related to bank 
performance (ROE, ROA and Tobin Q) are gathered 
from the annual balance sheet and income statement 
of these banks using Thomson Reuters Worldscope 
and ORBIS. Due to the data shortage, our final 
sample consists of balanced panel of data with 73 
banks from 11 European countries (see appendix 1) 
and 730 bank-year observations. 
 
3.2. Variables 
 
3.2.1. Dependent variables 
 
The bank performance is the dependent variable in 
this study. Following the previous empirical 
researches (e.g., Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Caprio 
et al. 2007; Staikouras et.al, 2007) we employ Tobin 
Q, return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) as 
proxies to measure the market valuation and the 
financial performance of the banks. 
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We define Tobin Q as the book value of total 
assets minus the book value of the equity plus the 
market value of the equity divided by the book value 
of total assets. Many other studies use this measure 
as dependent variable in order to examine the 
effectiveness of corporate governance such as 
Andres and Vallelado (2008) and Staikouras et.al 
(2007). 
Tobin Q is used to capture the value of future 
opportunities in investment. A higher Tobin Q 
advocates that the market anticipate that the 
company will raise its value due to various factors. 
In terms of this study, those factors could comprise 
the characteristics of the board of directors. If the 
market anticipates the characteristics of company 
increase the future performance, the Tobin Q will 
increase. 
We apply another measure of performance, the 
return on asset (ROA) which in the contrast of Tobin 
Q measure the actual company performance and it is 
calculated as the profit before tax divided by the 
total assets. Moreover, we use the return on the 
equity (ROE) which is calculated as the profit before 
tax divided by the equity. In both cases the earnings 
are collecting before tax to avoid the different 
taxation systems that are applied across the 
European countries. 
 
3.2.2. Explanatory variables 
 
The explanatory variables in this study are related to 
the board structure of the banks (the board size, the 
board composition and gender diversity) and CEO 
Characteristic (CEO duality).  
Following previous studies such as Conyon and 
Peck (2010) and Stairoukas (2007), the board size 
(BOASIZE) is defined as the natural logarithm of the 
number of director on the board. 
The board composition (OUTSIDERS) is 
calculated by using the proportion of outside 
directors which is defined as the number of non-
executive directors to the total number of directors. 
(Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Staikouras et.al, 2007; 
Link et.al, 2008). In addition, regarding the  
banks who adopt the two-tier board system, 
which consist of separating the two boards; the 
management boards and the supervisory boards, 
such Germany, the directors that belong to the 
supervisory board are considered as non-executives 
(Van Greuning and Brajovic-Bratanovic, 2003). As in 
De Cabo et al (2011), the Gender diversity variable is 
measured as the proportion of female directors 
relative to the total number of the board of 
directors. There is a few empirical studies who 
examine the importance of gender diversity and its 
impact on the European banks performance. CEO 
Duality which is a dummy variable and used to 
capture the board independency. Consistent with 
Setiyono and Tarazi (2014), this variable is equal to 
one if the CEO is the chairman of the board 
otherwise it is equal to zero. 
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
 
Besides these two types of measures (dependent and 
independent variables) , we introduce a set of 
control variables such as the Bank Size, financial 
leverage (Equity to total assets) and liquidity ratio 
(Loan to total assets ratio). Considering the existing 
empirical literature, different methods are used to 
calculate the bank size variable, such the net 
Income, the number of employees and the total 
assets, In this case and following Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) Staikouras et.al (2007), we have 
chosen to calculate this variable by using the natural 
logarithm of the total assets, since it is the most 
homogenous proxy used among different types of 
banks. The equity to asset (EA) is included as a 
measure of the overall capital strength and leverage. 
A low ratio indicates that the bank is relatively in 
risky position and a negative coefficient is expected 
on this variable. However, a higher equity could be 
explained by a cheaper cost of the capital and 
therefore a positive effect on profitability (Molyneux 
1993). The loan to assets (LA) ratio is used as proxy 
for catching bank liquidity. Since loans represent an 
important part of bank’s assets and difficult to trade 
in the secondary market, they are the least liquid 
assets in a bank’s balance sheet after fixed assets 
.Therefore, a low ratio indicates that the bank is 
characterized with excess stored liquidity while a 
high ratio suggest a relative illiquid bank.  
 
Table 1. Definition of the variables 
 
Variables Definition 
Dependent variables 
Return on 
asset (ROA) 
Profit before tax divided by Total Assets 
Return on 
equity (ROE) 
Profit before tax divided by Total Equity 
Tobin Q 
Book Value of Assets minus Book Value of 
Equity plus Market value of Equity divided 
by Book Value of Assets 
Independent variables 
Board Size Natural logarithm of the number of 
directors on the board 
Outsiders The ratio number of non-executive 
directors over the total number of 
directors 
Gender 
Diversity 
Proportion of female directors to the total 
number of the board of directors 
CEO Duality Binary variable equal to one if the CEO is 
the chairman of the board and zero 
otherwise 
Control variables 
Bank Size Natural logarithm of the total assets 
Financial 
leverage ratio 
Total Equity divided by Total Assets 
Liquidity ratio  Loans divided by Total Assets  
 
3.3. Model specification  
 
In order to examine the relationship between the 
corporate governance and bank performance we 
employ panel data analysis. The panel data analysis 
has several advantages. First, it control the 
unobservable and the constant heterogeneity which 
are in this case the specific characteristics of each 
bank for example the market perception, the 
management style and quality and business strategy. 
Moreover, panel data can identify time and 
individual effects which is difficult to be detectable 
by pure time series data or pure cross sectional. In 
particular, panel data are able to examine the 
complex issues related to dynamic behavior (Baltagi, 
2005). To analyze the relationship between the 
characteristics of corporate governance and bank 
performance, numerous studies have used the panel 
data analysis using the pooled Ordinary least 
squares (OLS) or fixed effects estimation (Yermak, 
1996; Belkhir, 2009; Adam and Mehran, 2008; 
Staikouras et al, 2007, Andreas and Vallelado, 2008, 
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among others). Andreas and Vallelado (2008) 
suggest that when the unobserved and the 
independent variables are correlated, pooled OLS 
estimations produces estimators that are 
inconsistent and biased. In order to overcome this 
econometric problem they used either the first 
differences or the fixed effects. In our research, we 
use panel data analysis fixed and random effects. In 
order to select the most efficient and consistent 
model, we use the Hausmen test to choose between 
the two models. The fixed effects model control the 
effect of time invariant with the effects of time 
invariant variables, while the random effect model, it 
assumes that the unobserved variables are 
uncorrelated with all the observed variables. 
We model the performance of bank i at time t by: 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑘𝑌𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
 (1) 
 
Where 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the stacked vector of 
the dependent (endogenous) variable (the ith bank 
performance on the tth period), 𝑌𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 is the matrix of 
K bank-specific corporate governance measures and 
control independent (explanatory) variables, 𝛽0,𝑖 is 
the bank-specific intercept in the fixed-effects 
model, 𝛽1,𝑘 is the matrices of coefficients and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is a 
vector of error terms. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics on the 
corporate governance variables, the bank 
performance measures and the control variables for 
the sample of European banks over the period         
2002-2011. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (2002-2011) for all countries 
 
Variables # Obs. Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variables 
Tobin Q 730 1.0272 1.0158 0.1664 0.0842 2.0322 
ROA 730 0.0114 0.0098 0.0427 -0.1256 0.1057 
ROE 730 0.0970 0.1068 1.0680 -0.3607 0.5000 
Independent/Control variables 
Board Size 730 15.8699 15.0000 5.7987 6.0000 34.0000 
Outsiders 730 0.7567 0.7692 0.1346 0.1379 0.9630 
Gender Diversity 730 0.0898 0.0667 0.1001 0.0000 0.6250 
CEO Duality 730 0.3014 0.0000 0.4592 0.0000 1.0000 
Bank Size 730 10.9346 10.6319 2.0187 4.4976 14.7658 
Financial leverage  730 0.1163 0.05914 0.1762 -0.2103 0.9916 
Liquidity ratio  730 0.5187 0.60837 0.2894 0.0000 1.0004 
 
The number of the board of directors varies 
from 6 to 34 directors. Moreover, the mean and 
median size of the board are 15.86 and 15 
respectively. Our results are close to Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) who found that the average board 
of directors is 15.78 over the period 1995 to 2005. 
Moreover, Booth et al (2002) demonstrate that 
banking holding companies have larger board of 
directors (16.37 directors in 1999) than the 
industrial firm (11.79 directors in 1999). The 
characteristic of a large board of directors in credit 
institutions is explained by different reasons. First, 
board size and bank size are positively related 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Yermalik, 1996) 
moreover, banks are bigger than manufacturing 
firms regarding their balance sheets aggregates. 
Second, the larger board of directors in banks is 
explained by their organizational structure which is 
very complex. Banks may control or own different 
subsidiary financial institutions which each of them 
has its own board. Therefore, the co-ordination 
amongst these different boards could have an 
impact on the structure of the bank board size. 
Finally, the nature of mergers and acquisitions in the 
financial sector has an important role in maintaining 
a larger board size of directors. The number of non-
executives directors varies from 13.79% to 96,29%, 
with a mean of  75.66% (Table 2) similar to 
Stairkouras et al (2007) they found that the number 
of non-executive directors in European banks varies 
from 16.67% to 90%. Furthermore, Booth et al (2002) 
demonstrate that industrial firms present a 
significantly a lower percentage of outside directors 
in their board of directors. They show that the 
outsiders (non-executive) directors present an 
average of 71.80 % which is less than the respective 
board size in banks 81.29%. The proportion of 
female on the board of directors varies between 0% 
and 62.5% with a mean of 8.97%. The presence of the 
female on the board of directors still very low in the 
European banks.  According De Cabo et al (2009) 
only 7% of the seats are held by women in a sample 
of 20 European banks. They find also that the 
maximum number of women in any European banks 
is 10 percent. Regarding the variable CEO duality, 30 
% of the CEO is also the chairman of the board 
however; the remaining 60% has a separation 
between the function of the CEO and chairman.  Our 
results are different from Belkhir (2009) who find 
that 65% of the cases that the CEO is also the 
chairman of the bank in a sample of 174 banks over 
the period 1995 -2002. As it concerns the bank 
performance measures over the period 2002-2011, 
The average Tobin Q ratio is higher than 1 and it 
varies between 0.08 and 2.03, the average return on 
assets (ROA)  stands for 1 % and it floats between -
12.57 % and 10.55% while the average return on 
equity (ROE) is 9.69 %. Our findings are close to 
Stairkouras et al (2008) which they find that the 
average Tobin Q is 1.03%, ROA is 0.75% and ROE is 
14.25% using a sample of 58 European banks. For 
the control variables, the average Equity to Asset 
ratio arises at 11.62% (the median is 5.91%), Loan to 
Asset ratio stands at 51.87 % and the median 
accounts for 60.83 %, the mean value of the SIZE 
which is the natural logarithm of the total assets is 
10.93. Table 3 reports the average value per country 
of the corporate governance variables (BOARDSIZE, 
Outsiders, Gender Diversity and CEO duality) and 
the bank performance measures (ROA, ROE, Tobin 
Q) and Figure 1 shows the board size of directors 
per country over the period 2002 – 2011. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics (2002-2011) per country 
 
Countries 
Variables 
# Obs. Board Size Outsiders Gender Diversity CEO Duality ROE ROA Tobin Q 
Germany 90 20.80 73.53% 12.15% 4.44% 6.63% 0.98% 0.915 
Italy  179 16.40 78.83% 1.46% 38.55% 7.79% 1.57% 1.009 
Greece 68 13.56 71.11% 10.21% 48.53% 6.77% 0.37% 1.026 
Sweden 39 12.49 88.78% 30.65% 46.15% 17.20% 1.59% 1.204 
Spain 89 13.89 78.96% 8.11% 33.71% 13.50% 1.27% 1.035 
Belgium 29 17.14 78.61% 12.73% 10.34% 4.55% 1.41% 0.978 
Netherland 39 12.38 60.36% 6.70% 43.59% 12.99% 1.25% 1.052 
Poland 49 16.39 54.34% 9.25% 40.82% 14.05% 1.56% 1.165 
UK 39 16.13 68.91% 11.79% 0.00% 12.74% 0.94% 1.012 
France  49 20.22 87.08% 9.03% 22.45% 8.76% 0.65% 0.999 
Switzerland 49 11.98 83.39% 8.26% 22.45% 8.74% 0.66% 1.059 
 
Figure 1. Board size of directors per country 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Outsiders, gender diversity 
and CEO duality per country 
 
 
 
The mean size of the board of directors varies 
between 12.49 and 22.80 in the European Banks. 
The French and German banks have the largest 
board of directors with 20.22 and 20.80 members 
respectively, whereas Switzerland has the smallest 
board of directors with only 12.49 members. 
All the banks in the sample show a high 
proportion of non-executive directors. Swedish and 
French banks show a high proportion of outside 
director’s accounts for 88.78 % and 87.07% 
respectively.  However, Netherlands and Poland 
show the lowest proportion with 54.34% and 60.36% 
respectively. The presence of the women on the 
board of directors varies according to the European 
banks. Sweden present the highest proportion of the 
female on the bank’s board with an average of 30.65 
% followed by Belgium with 12.73% and Germany 
12.15%. Italian banks, on the other hand, have the 
lowest proportion 1.46% followed by Dutch banks 
with 6.70%. The difference in the proportion of 
female in the board directors could be explained by 
the regulations imposed in some European 
countries.  
Regarding The CEO duality variable whether the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) holds the same 
position as the Chairman of the board. UK banks 
present the lowest proportion of the CEO duality, in 
our sample UK banks separate the role of the board 
chair and the CEO.  Also, German Banks present a 
low percentage of CEO duality with 4.44 % as most 
of German banks adopt two-tier board structure 
where the supervisory and the management board 
are separated. Greece and Sweden present the 
highest percentage of this variable account for 48.53 
% and 46.15 % respectively. 
The different results between the European 
banks are explained by the fact that some countries 
use the one-tier system and the other adopt the two-
tier system. As it concerns, the bank performance 
variables, during the period 2002-2011, Swedish 
banks present the highest return on equity (17.20%) 
return on asset (1.59 %) and Tobin Q (1.204). 
Although, Belgium presents the lowest return on 
equity with (4.55%), France the lowest return on 
asset (0.65%) and Germany the lowest TOBIN Q with 
(0.915). 
 
4.2. Corporate governance empirical results 
 
4.2.1. Corporate governance and European bank 
performance during 2002-2011 
 
We first start by examining the relation between the 
corporate governance variables and the European 
banks performance (Tobin Q, ROE and ROA) for the 
full sample period (2002-2011). We apply the usual 
procedure for choosing between fixed and random 
effects by using the Hausman test statistic for the 
difference between the fixed-effects and random 
effects estimates. The test rejects the random-
effects specification to all model specifications so 
fixed effects estimations are employed. Table 4 
report the results. 
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Table 4. Corporate governance and bank performance (2002-2011) 
 
The sample consists of 73 European banks for the period 2002 to 2011. Tobin Q is the book value of assets minus book value of 
equity plus market value of equity divided by book value of assets, Return on assets (ROA) is calculated as profit before tax 
divided by total assets, Return on equity (ROE) is defined as profit before tax divided by total equity, Board Size is defined as the 
natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board, Outsiders is the ratio number of non-executive directors over the total 
number of directors, Gender Diversity is the proportion of female directors to the total number of the board of directors, CEO 
Duality is a binary variable equal to one if the CEO is the chairman of the board and zero otherwise, Bank Size is calculated as the 
Natural logarithm of the total assets, Financial leverage ratio is calculated as total equity divided by total assets and Loans is 
defined as loans divided by total assets. t-statistics in parenthesis. Superscripts indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (*), 0.05 
(**) and 0.10 (***) percent levels. 
 Tobin Q ROE ROA 
Board Size 
0.0669*** 
(4.306) 
-0.0361*** 
(-2.986) 
0.0192** 
(2.0431) 
Outsiders 
0.0249 
(0.6438) 
0.1263*** 
(4.201) 
0.0004 
(0.086) 
Gender Diversity 
0.2547*** 
(4.863) 
0.0352 
(0.863) 
0.00434 
(0.0070) 
CEO Duality 
0.0084 
(0.766) 
0.0076 
(0.884) 
0.0007 
(0.520) 
Equity 
-0.4665*** 
(-14.321) 
-0.0733*** 
(-2.892) 
0.0188*** 
(4.866) 
Loans 
-0.0354* 
(-1.760) 
-0.0092 
(-0.585) 
-0.0058** 
(-2.433) 
Size 
-0.0321*** 
(-10.855) 
0.0058** 
(2.512) 
-0.0012*** 
(-3.420) 
Constant 
1.2260*** 
(24.060) 
0.234*** 
(5.913) 
0.0197*** 
(3.256) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.349 0.185 0.140 
Nr. observations 730 730 730 
Hausman test 𝜒2(7) 25.216*** 26.497*** 36.991*** 
 
The adjusted R-squared for the different 
performance measures used varies between 14 and 
to 35% which indicates a very reasonable overall fit 
of the data to the regression line. When Tobin Q is 
used as dependent variable, the board size has a 
positive impact on the bank performance ratio at 1% 
level of significance. Banks with large board of 
directors have higher Tobin Q ratio. The results 
show that a large board of directors has a positive 
impact on bank performance when it is measured by 
Tobin Q. Boards with large number of directors has 
crucial role in improving the advisory and 
monitoring functions, enhance governance and 
increase returns. Also, having a great number of 
advisors and supervisors reduces the power of the 
CEO. Moreover, the positive relationship could be 
explained by the fact that the banks are 
characterized by their complexity therefore, they 
need a large board of directors which play an 
important role in dealing with complexity. Our 
results are contrary to the theories which predict 
that small number of directors on the board are 
more efficient (eg. Staikouras et al, 2007). Our 
findings are in line with Belkhir (2009), Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) and Adams and Mehran (2005) who 
find that the addition of new director in the board 
has a significant and positive relationship with 
Tobin Q. They provide evidence that rise in board 
sizes would add value to bank holding company. The 
coefficient of Outsiders variable, which is the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board, 
is positive but insignificant. This result is consistent 
with Andres and Vallelado (2008), Adams and 
Mehran (2003) and Love and Rachinsky (2007). As it 
concerns the banking sector, the positive 
relationship between the board composition and the 
performance is explained by the objective view of 
the non-executive directors regarding the company. 
Therefore, they are more suitable to accomplish the 
supervisory function. However, the insignificant 
relationship between the two variables is consistent 
with the theory; due to regulatory requirement, 
directors do not emphasize to maximize the value of 
the company over the soundness and safety. Thus, 
Banks’ regulations have an important role on board 
structure with regard to size and composition. The 
Gender diversity variable is positive and significant 
at 1 % level meaning that the proportion of females 
on the board of directors has a positive impact on 
the bank performance measured by Tobin Q ratio. 
The presence of the female on the board of directors 
has a crucial role in increasing board’s independence 
since women tend to ask different questions than 
male directors. Moreover, female directors are 
considered as hard working person and have better 
communication skills which enable them to add 
value in the firm by improving the decision making 
ability and the problem solving of the board. Our 
findings are consistent with Carter et al (2003) and 
Pathan and Faff (2013). Still according to the results 
in table 4, the coefficient of CEO duality is positive 
but insignificant in relation with Tobin Q. The fact 
that the CEO is also the board chair of the directors 
has no significant impact on the bank performance, 
because the additional responsibilities accorded to 
the CEO do not significantly add capacity to the CEO 
to influence the performance. This results support 
Griffith et al (2002) and Adnan et al (2011). However, 
the result of this study contradicts different number 
of previous studies Belkhir (2009) which implying 
that the CEO duality enhance the bank performance. 
As it concerns the control variables, the bank size 
appears to be negatively and statistically significant 
with Tobin Q ratio at 1 % level of significance. This 
could be explained by the increase of portfolio 
diversification which leads to lower the risks and 
therefore lower the return of the bank. Our results 
support Staikouras et al (2007) while it contradict 
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the previous studies which explain that the bank 
size and bank performance are positively correlated 
this is due to the economies of scale, they 
demonstrate that the economies of scale increases 
with bank size which in turn improves the bank 
performance (Akhavein et al , 1997). The coefficient 
of the Loan to total asset (LA) demonstrates a 
negative and significant effect on bank performance 
at 10% level of significance. This ratio is used as a 
proxy to measure the bank liquidity. Our results are 
on line with Molyneux and Thornton (1992). The 
negative relationship could be explained by the fact 
that the banks are rapidly growing their loan 
portfolio therefore they have to pay a greater cost 
for their funding requirement and this could have a 
negative impact on the value of the firm. Finally, the 
equity to total asset ratio (EA) coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant at 1 % level of 
significance. This ratio is included as a measure of 
leverage and capital strength and its effect on bank 
performance.  
In the second model we use ROE (return-on-
equity) as bank performance measure. The results 
show that the Board size coefficient (BOARDSIZE) is 
negative and significant at 1% level for ROE. This 
illustrates that the performance of the European 
banks is deteriorated with the presence of large 
board of directors. This result is consistent with the 
results of the studies conducted by Stairoukas et al 
(2007), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Yermack 
(1996). The board of directors become less efficient 
when the number of directors rises, this is due to 
the considerable problems related to the decision 
making time, coordination and communication 
between the boards. The presence of non-executive 
directors improves the monitoring of management 
and decreases the conflict of interest among the 
stakeholders. Moreover, when banks employ a new 
outside director with advisory competences, the 
strategic decisions should enhance since there is a 
complementary relationship between the counselling 
capabilities of the non-executive directors and those 
of the CEO. Thus, the bank performance will be 
improved. Regarding the gender diversity and the 
CEO duality variables, results show that the 
coefficients of these two variables are positive but 
not statistically significant for ROE. The presence of 
the female on board of directors has no significant 
impact on bank performance, this is due to the low 
proportion of female the European banks, therefore, 
they play a minor role on the board of director, In 
addition, small boards, who are male dominated and 
where the homogeneity preference’s is stronger will 
pursue to hold back the female to the access to the 
top positions on banks. Our finding supports 
Setiyono and Tarazi (2014), Terjesen and Singh 
(2008), De Cabo et al (2009). The coefficient of the 
equity to total asset (EA) illustrates a negative and 
significant at 1 % level of significance (same result as 
Tobin Q). Also, the sign of the Bank size is positive 
and statistically significant at level of 5%, the result 
is different when Tobin Q is used as dependent 
variable which shows a negative and significant 
relationship between the two variables. This is due 
to the different proxies used to measure the bank 
performance. Finally, the coefficient of the loan to 
total assets (LA) is negative but statistically 
insignificant. 
In the last model on table 4, we use ROA 
(return-on-assets) as a performance measure. Similar 
to previous findings when Tobin Q is used as 
dependent variable, the board size (BOARDSIZE) is 
positive and significant with the ROA ratio at 5% 
level of significance. Moreover, the coefficient of the 
non-executive directors (OUTSIDERS) is positive but 
insignificant with ROA (same results as for Tobin Q). 
The significance of this variable is only observed 
when ROE is used as dependent variable. Regarding 
CEO duality, the coefficient of this variable is 
positive but statistically insignificant, this result ties 
on well with those studies that find no significant 
relationship between CEO duality and ROA such as 
Griffith et al,(2002); Adnan et al, (2011). For gender 
diversity we find a positive and significant 
relationship with ROA supporting Pathan and Faff 
(2013), the presence of the female on the board of 
director has significant impact on bank 
performance. For this model, all the control 
variables are significant. The Equity to total assets 
(EA) presents a positive and significant relationship 
with ROE at 1% level of significance. This results are 
consistent with the finding conducted by Stairkouras 
et al (2007) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992). The 
positive relationship could be explained by a high 
level of equity which suggest a decrease in the cost 
of capital and therefore, this variable may have a 
positive effect on profitability. On the other hand, a 
rise in capital may increase the expected earnings by 
decreasing the estimated cost of financial distress, 
as well as the bankruptcy cost. The coefficient sign 
of the bank size (SIZE) is negative but significant at 
1% level of significance. Moreover, the Loan to total 
asset (LA) presents negative and significant 
relationship with ROA at 5% level of significance. 
To sum up, under different measures of the 
bank performance (Tobin Q, ROE, ROA), we find a 
mixture of results, regarding the Board size 
(BOARDSIZE), there is positive and significant 
relationship between board size and bank 
performance using Tobin Q and ROA. The result are 
in line with Andreas and Vallealdo (2008) Adams 
and Mahran (2005). Boards with large number of 
directors has crucial role in improving the advisory 
and monitoring functions, enhance governance and 
increase returns. Also, banks are characterized by 
their complexity therefore, they need a large board 
of directors which play an important role in dealing 
with complexity. This result are in line with our 
expectation, hypothesis 1 is accepted. 
The board composition is positively related to 
bank performance, whereas the sign of the 
coefficient is not significant in most of the cases 
(Tobin Q and ROA). As we mentioned above, the 
positive relationship between the board composition 
and the performance could be explained by the 
objective view of the non-executive directors 
regarding the company. Therefore, they are more 
suitable to accomplish the supervisory function. 
While the non-insignificance relationship is 
consistent with the regulatory requirement in 
banking sector, directors do not emphasize value 
maximization over the soundness and the safety of 
the firm. Our finding is consistent with Stairoukas 
(2007) but is not in line with our expectation as we 
assumed a positive and significant relationship with 
the bank performance, Hypothesis 3 is rejected. 
The Gender diversity and the bank 
performance are positively and significantly related 
to the bank performance in most specification, our 
findings are consistent with Carter et al (2003) and 
Pathan and Faff (2013). The female directors are 
considered as hard working person and have better 
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communication skills which enable them to add 
value in the firm by improving the decision making 
ability and the problem solving of the board. The 
hypothesis 5 is accepted. 
In all the models, CEO duality presents a 
positive but non-significant relationship under the 
different proxies of the bank performance (ROE, 
ROA, and Tobin Q). The funding supports Griffith et 
al (2002) and Adnan et al (2011). This could be 
explained that the additional responsibilities 
accorded to the CEO do not significantly add 
capacity to the CEO to influence the performance. Or 
it could be explained by the relative variability of the 
CEO duality variable during the sample period which 
it makes hard to identify the effect of the leadership 
structure on bank performance. This result is not in 
line with our expectation, hypothesis 7 is rejected. 
4.2.2. Corporate governance and European bank 
performance during (pre and during/post financial 
crisis) 
 
In this section we divide the sample of European 
banks in two sub-periods: pre financial crisis (2002 
to 2006) and during/post financial crisis (2007-
2011). We consider a period during/post financial 
crisis since the literature is not clear regarding the 
beginning and end of the financial crisis in 
particular in the banking sector due to the 
successive government bailouts in different years. In 
table 5, panels A and B the results for the period pre 
(2002-2006) and during/post financial crisis are 
presented. Again we employ fixed effects 
estimations.  
 
Table 5. Corporate governance and bank performance pre, during/post financial crisis (2002-2006) 
 
The sample consists of 73 European banks for the period 2002 to 2006. Tobin Q is the book value of assets minus book value of 
equity plus market value of equity divided by book value of assets, Return on assets (ROA) is calculated as profit before tax 
divided by total assets, Return on equity (ROE) is defined as profit before tax divided by total equity, Board Size is defined as the 
natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board, Outsiders is the ratio number of non-executive directors over the total 
number of directors, Gender Diversity is the proportion of female directors to the total number of the board of directors, CEO 
Duality is a binary variable equal to one if the CEO is the chairman of the board and zero otherwise, Bank Size is calculated as the 
Natural logarithm of the total assets, Financial leverage ratio is calculated as total equity divided by total assets and Loans is 
defined as loans divided by total assets. t-statistics in parenthesis. Superscripts indicate statistical significance at 0.01 (*), 0.05 
(**) and 0.10 (***) percent levels. 
Panel A: Pre Financial Crisis (2002-2006) 
 Tobin Q ROE ROA 
Board Size 
0.0213** 
(2.048) 
0.0385*** 
(2.924) 
-0.0036 
(-0.660) 
Outsiders 
0.3182*** 
(3.452) 
0.0293 
(0.338) 
0.0147 
(1.302) 
Gender Diversity 
0.2265 
(1.674) 
0.3199** 
(2.424) 
0.0373** 
(2.168) 
CEO Duality 
-0.0219 
(-0.757) 
-0.0153 
(0.5759) 
-0.0032 
(-0.897) 
Equity 
0.1892 
(0.0905) 
0.0922 
(0.881) 
0.0671*** 
(4.907) 
Loans 
0.2229*** 
(3.159) 
0.0212 
(0.319) 
0.0113 
(1.303) 
Size 
0.0457*** 
(2.993) 
0.0565*** 
(3.938) 
0.00837*** 
(4.473) 
Constant 
0.1681 
(0.785) 
-0.439** 
(-2.179) 
-0.092955*** 
(-3.539) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.773 0.343 0.589609 
Nr. observations 365 365 365 
Panel B: During/Post Financial Crisis (2007-2011) 
 Tobin Q ROE ROA 
Board Size 
-0.0378* 
(-2.337) 
-0.0267* 
(-2.478) 
0.0061 
(0.006) 
Outsiders 
-0.0331* 
(-1.673) 
-0.1963* 
(-1.909) 
0.0014 
(0.085) 
Gender Diversity 
-0.1211 
(0.985) 
-0.0130 
(-0.101) 
-0.0091 
(-0.444) 
CEO Duality 
-0.0864** 
(-2.385) 
-0.0041 
(-0.107) 
-0.0008 
(-0.135) 
Equity 
0.7492*** 
(3.2827) 
0.5848** 
(2.449) 
0.234*** 
(6.172) 
Loans 
0.1691 
(1.5356) 
-0.0222 
(-0.1922) 
0.0013 
(0.070) 
Size 
0.0301 
(0.832) 
-0.0794** 
(-2.099) 
0.0070 
(1.164) 
Constant 
0.4559 
(1.031) 
1.1254 
(2.433) 
-0.1120 
(-1.526) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.659 0.419 0.292 
Nr. observations 365 365 365 
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The board size variable presents a positive and 
significant coefficient at level of 5 % before the 
financial crisis for all the performance measures 
except of ROA while a negative and significant 
coefficient at level of 10 % for the most bank 
performance (expect for ROA) during/after the 
financial crisis. The result shows that boards with 
small number of directors have performed better 
than the largest ones during and post financial 2008. 
Our finding is consistent with Hoque and Muradoglu 
(2010). Our result could be explained that a smaller 
boards are quicker and faster in making better 
decisions in tough period such crisis. Therefore our 
second hypothesis is accepted. 
The Outsiders variable which is defined as the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board 
of directors had a positive but insignificant 
coefficient for the overall sample (expect for ROE) 
reported in the previous section. According to the 
result shown in the table 5 (panel A), the board 
composition (outsiders) presents a positive and 
significant relationship with Tobin Q at 1 % level of 
significance but insignificant relationship with ROE 
and ROA. Whereas, during/post the financial crisis, 
the results show that the board composition and the 
performance measures are negatively (expect for 
ROA) and statistically significant at 10% level of 
significance for ROE and Tobin Q.  This implies that 
the performance of the bank is better when there are 
fewer external directors on the board of directors. 
Thus, boards with fewer interconnections were more 
efficient during the financial crisis, so that directors 
can concentrate more on a specific board. This 
result support Guner et al (2008) and Erkens et al 
(2012). They find that board with higher number of 
independent directors perform worse during the 
crisis 2008. Hypothesis 4 is accepted. 
The presence of women on the board of 
directors, before the crisis (2002-2006) is positive 
and significant at level of 5 % for ROE and ROA (10% 
level for Tobin Q). However, during the global 
financial crisis the gender diversity variable is 
negatively but not significantly related to all the 
performance measures used in this paper. Gender 
diversity does not add any value to the bank 
performance during the crisis as the woman are 
more risk averse and are afraid in making decision 
compared to the male during the crisis. Our result is 
in line Hoque and Muradoglu (2010). Hypothesis 6 is 
rejected. 
Regarding the impact of CEO Duality on bank 
performance during/post and before the crisis, we 
notice that the sign of the coefficient variable is 
negative but statistically no significant during pre-
crisis for all the performance measures, while 
during/post crisis there is a negative but non-
significant relationship in most cases with ROA and 
ROE (except for Tobin Q). Hypothesis 8 is accepted. 
This implies when the CEO of the bank hold also the 
position chairman of the board, the performance of 
the bank declines. This is in contradiction to general 
belief, when during the crisis there is a positive and 
significant relation between the CEO duality and 
firm performance as when the two positions are 
combined, one single leader could have a better 
influence. The person has a greater knowledge to the 
company and industry than an external chairman, 
moreover, the CEO-chairman can fix a clear goal to 
raise the shareholder value and recover from the 
crisis. However, the negative and non-significant 
relationship in our studies could be explained that 
both of the CEO and the chairman of the bank have 
respond collaboratively and prudently to the 
financial crisis but their collaboration do not add 
value to the bank. The results support Grove et al 
(2011) and Carty and Weiss (2012). With regards to 
the control variables, the equity to total asset (EA) 
present a positive and significant relationship with 
ROA at 1% level of significance during the period of 
non-crisis, while during/post the crisis we found a 
positive and significant relationship with all the 
performance measures analysed. The loan to total 
asset (LA) and the bank performance measures are 
positively and significantly related to 1% with only 
Tobin Q during the non-crisis, whereas is positively 
but not statistically significant to Tobin Q and ROA 
and negatively related to ROE during/post crisis. 
During the financial crisis, the bank performance 
has decreased dramatically as loan losses has 
increased. During the period of non-crisis the bank 
size demonstrates a positive and significant 
relationship with all the dependent variables at level 
of 1 % while during/post crisis a negative and 
significant relation with only ROE at level of 5%. This 
is implies that the biggest banks saw the largest loss 
during the financial crisis compared to the smaller 
ones. This funding supports Cornett et al (2009). 
Overall, during and post financial crisis larger banks 
are less profitability than smaller ones. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study we investigate the impact of the 
corporate governance on bank performance in a 
sample of 73 large European banks over the period 
2002-2011. More specifically, the corporate 
governance proxies examined in this study are the 
board size, the gender diversity, the CEO Duality and 
the proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board of directors, whereas the bank performance is 
captured by accounting measures (ROA and ROE) 
and market value measure (Tobin Q). 
To our knowledge, this is the first study which 
relates bank performance with corporate governance 
measures during and post the global financial crisis 
in 2008 for European countries. 
Our results can be summarized as follows: i) 
board size is positively related with performance 
before crisis and negative afterwards; ii) During/post 
financial crisis the board with small number of 
directors have outperformed the one with the larger 
boards this could be explained that small board of 
directors is more efficient in tough periods as they 
take quick decision compared to the larger boards; 
iii) During/post the crisis, the results show that the 
board composition and the performance measures 
are negatively and statistically significant; iv) no 
significant relationship was found between gender 
diversity and the bank performance  
Overall, our results show that corporate 
governance variables have a real impact on bank 
performance. The mixture of the results depend on 
the performance measure used as well the time 
period analysed. Additional research is needed to 
better understand the impact of corporate 
governance on bank performance, for example, it is 
worthy to include other corporate governance 
measures such the composition and the nature of 
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the audit committee, the ownership structure, or to 
incorporate other variables related to the 
characteristics of the board of directors or the CEO, 
for instance, the average tenue in bank, the 
education or the trajectory carrier. 
We believe that this paper had added further 
empirical evidence to the past studies. As we stated 
above this paper is the first, to our knowledge 
associated the bank performance with the corporate 
governance measures during the global financial 
crisis for European countries. In addition, we 
employed different corporate governance proxies 
such as the gender diversity and the CEO duality, 
since most of the studies related to the European 
countries have used only the board size and the 
board composition. 
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